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front by gradual and imperceptible accretion ? In Angell on
Watercourses, § 59, it is said that "if a navigable lake recede.
gradually and insensibly, the derelict land belongs to the adjacent
riparian proprietors." The learned judge's direction to the jury
was in accordance with that rule.
Then as to the effect of the defendant's grant. Whatever
doubt, if any, there might be as to what would be conveyed by
the word "lake" in a grant, the subsequent words of the grant
in this case, whereby the mines and minerals are excepted, evi-
dence a clear intention, on the part of the Crown, to convey the
soil of the lake to the defendant.
Whether the place where the assault was committed was the
defendant's land or not, the assault, or at least a part of it, was
entirely unjustified according to the defendant's own account of
it; therefore the plaintiff would be entitled to retain the verdict
for the damages assessed on the 3d count; but unless he consents
to confine the verdict to that count, we think there ought to be a
new trial.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.'
SUPREME COURT OF MAINE.2
SUPREME COURT OF MIARYLAND.8
SUPREME COURT OF MIsSOURI.A
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK. 5
AGENT.
Evidence-Statement of an Agent.-The statements of an agent are
admissible, to charge the principal, only when they are a part of the rs
gestse. They are not admissible when made out of the presence of the
principal, and to a third person having nothing to do with the subject-
matter, and at a time when the agent was not engaged in the business
to which the controversy relates : Whiteside v. Atargarel, 51 Ills.
I From N. L. Freeman, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 51 Illinois Rep.
2 From W. W. Virgin, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 57 Maine Rep.
3 From J. S. Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 32 Md. Rep.
4 From C. C. Whittlesey, Esq., late Reporter; to appear in 46 or 47 Mo. Rep.
5 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in vol. 57 of his reports.
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An agency cannot be proven by the mere statement of the alleged
agent: Id.
Gifts, &c., from Principal to Agent-Purchases by Agent.-It is a
well-settled rule of equity jurisprudence that all gifts, contracts or bene-
fits from'a principal to one occupying a fiduciary or confidential relation
t6 him, are constructively fraudulent and void.: Comstock et al. v. Com-
tock, Ex'r., 57 Barb.
The court, in such cases, acts upon the principle that if confidence isreposed it must be faithfully acted upon,; if influence is acquired it
must be kept free from the taint of selfish interest and conniving and
overreaching bargains: Id.
It is for the common security of mankind that gifts procured byagents, and purchases made by them, from their'principals, should be
scrutinized with a close-and vigilant suspicion. So of notes, bills, con-
trabts, releases and obligatibns: Id.
Duty of Agents to -Pncials.-Agents are -not permitted to deal withtheir principals, in any case except upon showing the most entire good
ith.; A full diScloSure of 'all the 'facts and circumstances" attending
the transaction, and an absenc of' all' undue influence or imposition.
" Papers obtained by Agent from his Principal- When presumptively
.fraudulent.-"A son, while"acting as agent for his' mother, a lady 77years of age, in the transaction of'her bkdsihess, 'obtained fr6ni her' aieceipt, contract aid note, which we'e in his handWritii Sud 'for his
Penefit, she iving with him 'at the time. The' don, n bnan accountiIng
before th'e' surrogate as 'executor of his" moler, while, claining'un4der
the instrumefits, merely pr6ved the sigfiature of t' Ite9tatrix thereto,
i4ithout offeriig any evidence of the facts and circumstances 'inder
*11ch thd w're made; of their coniiderdtionobject''n' purpose; of
tV'erreaoim. 'from 'undue infliience 6 'iipbsition; "of 'ofgdod faith:
JWdM., that, without assulming the existence of actuial-fraud,' the la'niiant
occupying, a" d6nfidential' relation to his mother, as i ag'ent, *',tb'time'the instruments" pqirpbited to be executed,-the / er"l'beaiise of
thaf relation, presumptively fraudulent and void, as to her, or her'repre-
senaatives; which *presumption ould only be overcone by actual proof:
AGREEMENT.
Waiver of Claim for Defects.-The plaintiff agreed to furnish tothe defendants an engine, boilers, &c., to be of the best materials andsihject to'the approval of the defendants' engineer,and to guarantee
thhit they'should be in porfect running order. The engine, &c., were
der verd, and notes given'for the price; but on attempting to use the
engine, one Of the flues collapsed, so as to prevent any further use of it.
Thed'plaintiff redaired the ties by putting in'new ones,' and the engine,as' repaired;: was, with the boilers,'approved by' the engineer, accepted
by the defendants, and c6ninhed to: be used 'by them: Held, thafthe
defendants, not having notified the plaintiff'oftheir determination not
to accept the enginde on' discovering thie defect. and having permitted
hifii to make alf'rhtibds, and continued to use the' engine afterwards,
this was to' be deeimed 'an acceptance of the same," and a waivdr of any
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claim on account of the previous defect: Cassidy v. Le Fevre et al.:
57 Barb.
Accordingly held, that for the delay caused by the substitution of
new flues, the defendants were not entitled to recover damages: Id.
For disposal of Stock- Construction of.-The defendant received
from the plaintiff's assignors certain shares of stock, and executed an
instrument acknowledging the receipt thereof, and further saying,
"which stock I am to do the best I can with, and have one-half of the
proceed-" Held, 1. That there was not an absolute sale of one-half of
the stock to the defendant. 2. That the fair and reasonable construc-
tion of the agreement was that defendant was to receive the certificates,
and within a reasonable time dispose of said stock upon the most ad-
vantageous terms which he could procure, and when that was accom-
plished, and the proceeds were realized, he was to receive one-half
thereof as his compensation. 3. That the sale or other disposition of
the stock by the defendant was a condition precedent to his acquiring
any interest in such stock or the proceeds thereof; and that the pro-
ceeds of the stock did not mean the stock itself. 4. That if the de-
feodant had sold the stock fairly at whatever price he could obtain, he
would have been entitled to retain one-half of the proceeds of the sale;
but that having retained the stock for more than ten years without
effecting a sale thereof, he was not entitled to retain one-half of such
stock as his own, but was bound to account to the plaintiff for said
stock, together with the dividends he had received thereon: Wight v.
Wood, 57 Barb.
AMENDMENT.
Amount of Damages laid.-Where this court has jurisdiction of the
parties and subject-matter in a writ returnable thereto, and the ad dam-
num is fixed at a sum below the jurisdiction of this court, but within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior court, the ad damnum may,
before trial, be increased, so as to bring the action within the jurisdic-
tion of this court: Merrill v. Curtis, 57 Me.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Usury.
Defence of want of Consideration.-Where several payees of a promis-
sory note unite in endorsing the same to one of their number and another
person, the endorsees stand in the same situation, precisely, in respect
to the defence of a want of consideration, that a payee does, where the
note is endorsed to him alone, by the other payees: Saxton et al. v.
Dodge et al., 57 Barb.
And as, in the latter case, the note is open to the defence of a want
of consideration, without alleging notice to him of such want, so another
person, by becoming a holder jointly with the payee, or one of the pay-
ees, subjects himself to the same defence: Id.
A payee will not be allowed to get rid of a defence by transferring a
share in his obligation to another: Id.
By taking an interest or share only in the note, he must be held to
take subject to any defence which may lawfully be interposed against
his co-endorsee: Id.
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CORPORATION.
Accepfance of an, Act of Assernbl-Acceptance of a Charter- Con-
ditions precedent- Construction of a Contract.-Acceptance of an Act
of Assembly by a corporation, may be inferred from the exercise of cor-
porate powers, or other unequivocal acts on its part; but this presump-
tion cannot prevail against direct proof: Lyons v. 0.) A., and Ml. Rail-
road o,, 32 Md.
As a general rule, when a charter is granted, whether it be one of
creation or an amendment to a pre-existing corporation, it must either
be accepted or rejected as offered, and without condition; and in accept-
ing the privileges conferred, the grantees will be required to perform
the conditions impo~ed: I'd.
But this rule, while applicable to subsequent conditions to be per-
formed after the organization of the company, does not apply to
conditions precedent, upon the strict performance of which the very
existence and exercise of powers on the part of the corporation de-
pend: d.
Conditions precedent are anything which, by the express provisions
of the statute, is made a condition to be performed on the part of the
cokporation before, and as a foundation of the exercise of the powers and
privileges under the charter: Id.
An assumption to pay the debts of a company admitted to be hope-
lessly insolvent, rateably according to the value of its assets, is not
substantially an agreement to pay its debts in full, "whether bonded or
floating, ascertained or to be ascertained :" Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Confessions.-A declaration or admission, if made before the accused
is conscious of being charged with, or suspected of crime, is admissible
in evidence under all circumstances, however made or obtaned; under
oath or without, upon a judicial proceeding or otherwise. But if made
afterwards, the law at once becomes cautious and hesitating. The true
inqtiry then is, was it voluntary? For, unless it is entirely voluntary,
it is held to be not admissible: Phillips v. The People, 57 Barb.
By voluntary is meant, proceeding from the spontaneous suggestion
of the party's own mind, free from the influence of any extraneous dis-
turbing cause: Id.
Where the accused, while under arrest for stealing a horse, was told
by the complainant, and again, in substance, by the officer, that "the best
he (the accused) could do was to own it vp; that this would be better
for him :" Held, that a confession made under this inducement of
advantage if he confessed, was not a voluntaryl confession: Id.
EAvidence.-On the trial of an indictment for stealing a horse, it is
not erroneous to admit evidence of the accused taking a wagon on the
same night, from another person. The taking of a wtgon, to use with
the stolen horse, if they were used together, is a corroborating circum-
stance to the main charge, and can be used as evidence for that purpose,
notwithstanding it is proof of another felony, not charged in the indict-
ment - Id.
Burglary, lossession of Stolen Propert.-Although it is a sound
proposition that mere possession, by a person, of stolen goods taken on
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the occasion of a burglary, that is. possession alone, without any other
facts indicative of guilt, is not prima facie evidence that such person
committed the burglary; yet where the prisoner was sho*f to have
been in the vicinity of the burglary just prior to the act, and to have
left there under circumstances of some suspicion ; and the evidence
tended to show that he was, soon thereafter, in possession of some of the
property stolen from the safe at the time of the burglary; and further,
that he prevaricated in regard to it, and made a false statement of the
manner in which it came to his possession: Held, that in this condition
of the case, possession of the stolen property by the prisoner, unex-
plained, was prima facie evidence on which to convict him of burglary:
Id.
Larceny of Promissory Xotes-Evidence of genuineness and value.-
On the trial of an indictment for larceny in stealing "promissory noteI."
a witness testified that the bills stolen "were of the currency ordina-
rily known as greenbacks :" Held, that this proof was some evidence,
at least, of their genuineness, and when taken in conjunction with the
further fact, to which he testified, that they were of the denomination
of one hundred dollar bills of that currency, there was enough evidence
also of the value to sustain a conviction : Remsen et al. v. The People,
57 Barb.
Good character.-Where the judge charged the jury that good char-
acter should not shield the prisoners if, from all the testimony, the jury
believed them to be guilty; that they were to consider all the evidence,
and where they bad a well-reasoned doubt arising out of all the testimony,
good character should protect the prisoners, and should insure their ac-
quittal, if the jury had any reasonable doubt arising out of the whole
testimony: Held, that the charge should be all taken together, and that
so taken, it could not have misled the jury: Id.
DEED.
Effect of.-The effect of a deed delivered as an escrow, as a convey-
ance, and its effect as being the written evidence of a contract between
the parties, to avoid the statute of frauds, should not be confounded.
The questions are not identical: Cagger Admr'x v. Lansing, 57 Barb.
DESERTION. See Voter.
EJECTMENT.
Legal Title-Defence.-A title by confirmation under the Act of
Congress of March 3d 1807, prior to the issue of a patent by the United
States, will not support or defend an action of ejeetment, a legal title
being in the opposite party. A defendant claiming under such con-
firmation must plead it in bar of the action as an equitable defence:
Lebeau v. Armitage, 46 or 47 Mo.
EQUITY. See Homestead; Mandamus.
EVIDENCE.
Admissions of a Vendor after the ,ale.-The statements of a vendor
of land made after the sale are not admissible for the purpose of show-
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ing the transaction was fraudulent, or to prove any other fact affecting
the title of the vendee: Gridley v. Bingham, 51 Ills.
Improper Evidence-Should not be admitted even with an explana-
tion.-Where a party offers matter in evidence which is not properly
admissible, the opposite party has the right to have it entirely excluded
from the jury; and its admission, even with an explanation from the
court to the jury as to its legal bearing, is erroneous : Rd.
So, in an action of ejectment, where the plaintiff sought to prove
statements made by the vendor of the defendant, after the sale to him,
relative to facts affecting the title of the defendant, the statements were
admitted against the objection of the defendant, with an explanation
by the court, that such statements were not evidence against the defend-
ant, but were evidence against his vendor: it was held, their admission
was erroneous, notwithstanding the explanation of the court, as they
would be likely to mislead the jury: Id.
To avoid a sale upon the ground that it was fraudulent as to creditors,
it must appear that both the vendor and vendee were parties to the
fraud: Id.
GIFT.
What constitutes.-A grandmother, from time to time, during a period
of five years, deposited various sums of money in the Savings Bank of
Baltimore, to the credit of five grandchildren, the accounts in the bank
being in the name of each, as a minor, and the deposits made subject to
her order, or that of her daughter. She also kept an account in bank
in her own name, the deposits being subject to the like order. About
the time the grandmother began to make these deposits to the credit
of her grandchildren, she declared that "she was going to put the money
in bank for the children." Under the by-laws of the savings bank,
guardians could deposit for the benefit of their wards, and parents for
their children; and if desired at the time of deposit, subject the same
to the control of such guardian or parent. The grandmother died, and
shortly after her death, the daughter, who was the executrix of her
mother, obtained from bank all the money that had been deposited to
the credit of the grandchildren, and administered it as a part of the
estate of her mother. Upon a bill filed in the name of the grand-
children against the daughter, to obtain an account of the moneys so
withdrawn by her, it was held, that the moneys deposited by the grand-
mother were perfected gifts, which she had no design to countermand;
and the donees were entitled to the several amounts which stood to
their credit in bank, when withdrawn by the defendant, with interest
thereon from the date of the withdrawal: Gardiner v. Merritt, 32 Md.
HOMESTEAD.
What constitutes Purchase-money.-A purchaser of land went into
possession and occupied it as a hiomestead. While so in possession he pro-
cured a third person to pay the purchase-price to the vendor, promising
to execute a mortgage to secure the repayment of the money as soon as
lie obtained a deed. He obtained the deed, but refused to execute the
mortgage. Upon bill filed by the party paying the money, against the
purehas-r, to enforce his lieu upon the land, it was held, that the money
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
paid by the complainant, having been paid by him directly to the vendor
for the purpose of having the land conveyed to the purchaser,.must be
regarded as the purchase-money of the premises, against which the de-
fendant could not assert a homestead exemption: Magee v. Magee, 51
Ills.
An objection to the jurisdiction of a court of chancery, on the ground
that there is an adequate remedy at law, comes too late after answer
-filed, unless it be in a class of cases where that court could under no
circumstances entertain jurisdiction : Id.
So where a person advances money for a purchaser of land, paying
the purchase-money to the vendor, upon the promise of the purchaser
to execute a mortgage when he obtained a deed, to secure the repay-
ment of the money, but the purchaser afterwards refuses to do so, and
the party so advancing the money files his bill in chancery to enforce
his lien upon the land, an objection to the jurisdiction in chancery
because there is an adequate remedy at law, to be availing, must be
made before answer filed: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
farried Woman- Will.-By the law of this state, a married woman
is competent to dispose, by a will rpade without her husband's assent,
of property which she was entitled to receive and hold to her sole and
separate use, whether before or since the Code, if the instrument creat-
ing the separate estate be silent as to the mode of disposition; and she
has also the power of devising, as if she were a feme sole, all the pro-
perty, real and personal, which belonged to her at the time of marriage,
if that took place since the adoption of the Code, and all the property
which she may have acquired or received since that period, by purchase,
gift, grant, devise, bequest, or in course of distribution : Schull v. Mur-
ray, 32 Md.
The will of a feme covert, professing to dispose of her property, must
be admitted to probate in the same manner as that of any other person,
capable in law of making a will; and the jurisdiction of the Orphans'
Court is limited to inquiries which relate to probate alone, such as tes-
tamentary capacity, fraud, undue influence, and the due execution of
the instrument: Id.
Upon a caveat to a will, the executor, not a party to the proceeding
in the capacity of executor, is competent to testify upon his own offer,
and in his own behalf, as caveatee: Id.
Mlarried Woman-Separate Estate.-A married woman possessed of
a separate estate, executing a note with her husband, will be presumed
to intend binding such estate; but where she purchases other lands and
joins with her husband in giving a note and deed of trust securing the
purchase-money, such presumption will not be made, and the property
mortgaged only will be held liable for the debt created for its purchase:
Kham v. Weiffert and Wife, 46 or 47 Mo.
Liability of Husband for Wife's Torts.-Where government bonds,
deposited with the defendants by the plaintiff, with express instructions
not to deliver them to any person except upon his written order, were
subsequently obtained from them by the plaintiff's wife fraudulently,
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by means of a forged order purporting to be signed by him: Held, that
the plaintiff being legally responsible for the fraud of his wife, he could
not recover from the defendants the value of the bonds: Kowing v.
Manley et al. 57 Barb.
The rule of the common law on this subject is not changed or affected
by the legislation in this state giving to married women the control of
their property. While the recent statutes relieve them from many of
the disabilities formerly resulting from the marital relation, they do not
discharge the husband from the liabilities which that relation imposed
on him for the torts of his wife: Id.
INSURANCE.
Construction ofa Polich, of Insurance against Fire.-By a policy of
insurance dated the 11th of November 1867, and executed by the com-
pany and delivered to ihe insured on that day, it was declared that the
company, in consideration of $160, to be actually paid to it by the in-
sured, within fifteen days from the date of the policy, did insure, B.
against loss or damage by fire to the amount of $4000 on his property
therein described; and in the clause that followed the description of
the property, it was set forth that the company promised and agreed
to make good unto the insured, his executors, &c., all such immediate
loss or damage, not exceeding, &e., as should happen by fire to the pro-
perty described, during one year, to wit, from the 11th of November
1867 (at 12 o'clock at noon), until the 11th day of November 1868
(at 12 o'clock at noon), the said loss or damage to be estimated, &c.
By a condition in the policy it was provided that the company should
not be held liable under the policy, or under any renewal thereof, until
the premium in full therefor was aetually paid; and by a further con-
dition it was mutually agreed that if the premium on the policy was not
paid within fifteen days from its date, the policy should be null and
void; and it was further'agreed that the policy was made and accepted
in reference to the terms and conditions therein set forth. A portion
of the property insured was totally destroyed by fire, and the balance
damaged by fire and water, within fifteen days of the execution and
delivery of the policy; proper preliminary proof of the loss was fur-
nished to the company. After the fire, and within fifteen days from
the date of the policy, the premium was tendered to the company by
the insured, but not accepted. An action was brought to recover on
the policy. Held, that the actual payment of the premium within
fifteen days from the date of the policy was a condition precedent to
the attaching of the risk, and as the property was destroyed before the
tender of payment within the time limited, there was nothing upon
which the risk could attach, and the company, therefore, was not liable
for the loss: Bradley v. -Potomac Fire Ins. Co., 32 Md.
Construction of Policy.-A policy of insurance against loss by fire,
taken out by a railroad company, described a portion of the property
insured as follows: "$2250 on two Murphy & Allison passenger cars,
say $1125 on each, one of them being used as a baggage and passenger
car, contained in the car-house marked No. 1 ; and $3000 on locomo-
tive engine J. I. Nicholson, contained in the engine-house marked No.
VoL. XIX.--9
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2." After the insurance, one of the Murphy & Allison cars was entirely
destroyed, and the engine greatly damaged by fire, while on the line of
the railroad, making a regular trip. Upon an action brought by the
railroad company against the insurance company for the injury thus
done to the car and engine, it was held, that the words "contained in"
were not intended merely to describe the car and engine covered by the
policy, but were designed to limit the risk of the insurance company to
the time during which the car and engine were actually in the car
and engine houses, and that having been injured when out of the car
and engine houses, no recovery could be had on the policy: Annapolis
and Elkridge Railroad Co. v. Baltimwre Fire Ins. Co., 32 Md.
Policy-Memorandum on .argn- Constructon.-The body of a
policy on a cargo of molasses provided that the company were "not
liable for leakage on molasses . . . unless occasioned by stranding or
collision." The margin contained the following memoranda: "On
molasses . . . if by shifting of cargo owing to stress of weather, any
casks become stove or bjoken, and the staves started by each other, so
as to lose their entire contents, and the same amount to fifteen per cent.
on the quantity laden (being five per cent. over ordinary leakage), the
said excess of five per cent. or over on the quantity shipped to be paid
for by the company; but this company not liable for leakage arising
from causes other than as above mentioned." Held, 1. That the com-
pany were not liable for any loss by leakage unless occasioned by strand-
ing; nor, 2. For any loss by shifting of the cargo unless it amounts to
fifteen per cent. of the whole quantity laden: McLaughlin v. Atlantic
Xut. Ins. Co., 57 Me.
Such memoranda upon the margin of a policy are a part of the
contract of insurance : Id.
JOINT DEBTORS.
Action against.-To maintain assumpsit for goods sold and delivered
against two defendants, the plaintiff must show a joint promise by the
defendants: Fuller v. Miller and Another, 57 Me.
Proof that the goods were delivered upon the credit of one of the
defendants as original promissor is not sufficient to bind both: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Xutual Accounts.-While the operation of the Statute of Limitations
is prevented by the running of 'mutual accounts, if some of the items
be within the period of limitation, the accounts, to have such effect,
must appear to be open and current, and show a reciprocity of dealing.
Mere payments on account, made by one party for which credit is given
by the other, will not constitute mutual accounts : Webster v. Byrnes,
32 Md.'
MANDAMtUS.
The writ of mandamus cannot properly be granted to a party apply-
ing therefor, who has previously, for the same causes of complaint,
instituted proceedings in equity, under which full, complete, and specific
relief may be afforded him: Hardcastle v. Maryland and Delaware
Railroad Co., 32 Md.
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NEGLIGENCE. See Railroad.
PARTITION.
Voluntary Partition among Coareners-ale- Vendor's Lien-
Owelty of Partition.-Certain real estate descended to four children
from their mother, was by agreement partitioned and allotted to and
among three of- them only, the fourth, in consideration of a certain sum
in gross, to be paid to her by each of the other heirs, agreeing to sur-
render to them all her interest in the several parts of the real estate
allotted to them respectively. At the time of making the division and
allotment, all the heirs entered into mutual covenants of ratification,
whereby they declared themselves satisfied and content with the division
and allotment made, and agreed to abide by and carry the same into
full effect. At the same time, one of the heirs taking the real estate,
executed to his sister his penal bond, without surety, for the payment
of the sum agreed on, with interest, in consideration bf the surrender
of her fourth part of the real estate. This money was not paid, and
there was no conveyance from the sister to the brother of her interest
in the part of the real estate allotted to him. He subsequently became
insolvent, being indebted to various persons besides his sister; to some
by judgment, and to one by mortgage of the real estate allotted to him;
this estate having been sold by the trustees in insolvency, and the pro-
ceeds of sale being in court for distribution among creditors, the sister
exhibited her claim, and insisted that it constituted a lien not only on
the one fourth interest surrendered to her brother, but on the whole
of that part of the real estate allotted to him by the award of parti-
tion; and that such lien had priority and preference of the mortgage
and judgment creditors of the insolvent. Held, that the surrender of
the entire interest of the sister in the estate, descended to her and
others, for a stipulated price in gross, constituted a sale and nothing
more; and she was entitled to a vendor's lien, restricted, however, to
the one-fourth part of the estate allotted to her brother in the partition:
Thomas v. Farmers' Bank, 32 Md.
The claim of a parcener who takes no part of the estate descended,
but surrenders all her interest therein to her coparceners for a stipu-
lated price, to be paid her, not as a rent issuing out of the estate, but
a sum in gross to be secured by bond or otherwise, bears no resemblance
to a charge for owelty of partition : I.
PARTNERSHIP.
Partnership Property-Right of one Partner to become the Owner.-
One member of a partnership firm cannot become the individual owner
of the partnership property, without the consent, and against the wishes,
of the other member: Comstock v. Buchanan, 57 Barb.
Although one partner may sell the property of the firm, and give a
good title to a third party, he cannot sell 
to himself: Id.
Where stock belonging to a partnership firm was surrendered by one
of the partners without the knowledge or consent of his partner, to the
company, he representing to the secretary that he had authority from,
and the consent of, his partner to do so, and procured new scrip to be
issued to himself, in lieu thereof: Held, that the transfer was fraudu-
lent and void; and that an assignee of the partner not consenting to
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS
the transfer could maintain an action to have the stock restored, and
the title thereto placed in the name and under the control of the right-
ful owners, subject to such equities as existed against it at the time of
the sale to him: Id.
Quo WARRANTO.
Information.-An information in the nature of a quo warranto to
determine the right to the office as between rival claimants, must set
fbrth all the facts which show that the relator is entitled to the office;
it is not sufficient to show that the person holding the office is dis-
qualified: State ex rel. Kempf v. Boal, 46 or 47 Mo.
RAILROAD.
Negligence-Passengers standing upon Platform.-One of a large
funeral party who took passage upon a train to go a distance of twelve
miles, was standing upon the steps of the platform of one of the cars
holding on to the railing, when the conductor came along collecting
fare. In making change for a bank note which the passenger paid for
his fare, the wind carried away the paper as it was passing from the
hand of the conductor to that of the passenger. The latter, in attempt-
ing to regain it, and as he was then standing on the edge of the plat-
form, or on the steps, lost his foothold and fell against an embankment,
was thrown back under the cars and killed. The cars were quite full,
but there was standing room in all of them. In an action against the
company, under the statute, to recover damages for the death of the
deceased, it was held, it was the negligence of the deceased, not that
of the company, which caused his death, and there could be no recovery:
Quinn v. The Ills. Cen. Railroad Co., 51 Ills.
While it is negligence on the part of a railroad company, for which
they should be held strictly accountable, not to furnish comfortable sit-
ting accommodations for their ordinary number of passengers, or even
for an extraordinary number, upon due notice, yet the same strictness
should not be applied when a train is unexpectedly crowded by a large
party going only a few miles: Id.
And even if it was the duty of the conductor, in this case, to have
advised the deceased to enter the car from the platform, at least while
paying his fare, his failure to do so was as nothing when compared with
the gross negligence of the deceased: .d.
RECORD.
Xotice.-The failure of the recorder of deeds to enter in his index
the names of the parties to a deed properly recorded, does not prevent
the recording from operating as a notice to all subsequent purchasers
Bishop v. xchneider, 46 or 47 Mo.
Purchaser for Value without Notice.-A party claiming title against
a prior deed as a purchaser in good faith without notice, must prove,
not only his purchase and want of notice, but that he has paid the
value before receipt of notice : Id.
SET-OFF.
What may be set off.-The right to set off one demand against
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another is wholly regulated by statute. A claim in set-off, to be avail-
able, must be due and payable when the plaintiff's action was begun;
and the fact that the plaintiff has assigned his property for the benefit
of his creditors, does not modify or change the rights of the parties:
Robinson v. Safford, 57 31e.
A mere liability as endorser, existing at the time when, but not dis-
charged till after, the plaintiff commenced his action, is not allowable
in set-off: Id.
Otherwise, money received by the plaintiff for his authorized transfer
of the defendant's shares of stock in a corporation prior to the con-
mencement of the action: Id.
Also, for amounts of drafts drawn by the defendant for the accom-
modation of the plaintiff, and paid by the former prior to the commence-
ment of the action: Id.
Also, for amount said by the defendant prior to the commencement
of the action, to redeem his shares of stock in a corjoration, pledged
by the plaintiff under a power of attorney from the defendant, to a
savings bank as collateral for money loaned to the plaintiff: Id.
Also, for items paid prior to the commencement of the action, for
protest: Id.
STAMPS.
Proof of intent in omitting.-An objection to a deed, that it is not
stamped as required by the Act of Congress, is unavailing, unless the
party objecting proves that the omission of stamps was with intent to
evade the statute: Cagger, Administratrix, v. Lenning, 67 Barb.
TRESPASS.
Trespass to the Person- What constitutes.-Where a party under
arrest, upon a charge of larceny, was taken from his place of confine-
ment to the outskirts of the town in the night time, by those having
the prisoner in charge, and one of the number, placing his hand upon
the prisoner's shoulder, produced a rope and required him to confess
the larceny, it was held, that such persons were guilty of an aggravated
trespass, for which they must respond in damages: Stallings v. Owens,
51 Ills.
Whether the rope was or was not placed about the prisoner's neck,
and whether he was or was not suspended to a tree for the purpose of
compelling a confession of a crime, and whether or not he suffered per-
sonal injury, are questions which do not go to the existence, but to the
degree of the injury: Id.
Exemplary Damages in an Action for seiz;ng and selling the Pro-
perty of one Person upon an Execution against another.-Where the
property of one person is seized upon an execution against another, and
sold, and the proceeds applied upon the debt, in an action of trespass de
lonis asportatis by the owner of the property against the officer and
plaintiff in the execution, in the absence of malice or abuse of process,
or a desire to do injury, the damages should be compensatory only:
Beveridge et al. v. Rawson, 51 Ills.
. The mere fact that the property was taken against the repeated remon-
strances of the owner, and his warning to the defendants that the pro-
perty belonged to him, would not, of itself, show that the seizure and
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sale were malicious, and to instruct a jury that the existence of such
fact is sufficient to authorize the finding of exemplary damages, would
be erroneous : Id.
UsuRy.
What constitutes, under Act of 1857.-Under the interest law of 1857,
a promissory note bearing twelve per cent. interest per annum, is usuri-
ous. That act prohibits the taking of any greater rate than ten per
cent. per annum, upon any kind of contract or for any species of con-
sideration : Hamill v. Mason et al., 51 Ills.
Such a case is not controlled by that of M Gill v. Ware, 4 Scam. 21,
in which it was held, that the taking of a legal rate of interest in ad-
vance, by deducting it from the sum loaned, was not usurious. But
that case was decided upon the authority of cases in other courts upon
statutes that declared a forfeiture of the whole debt, for usury, and in
this state, at that time, there was a forfeiture of three-fold the usury
reserved; and it is doubted whether such a rule would have obtained
had the forfeiture been no more than the interest: Id.
The statute against usury may be availed of under the general issue,
where the fact of usury appears from the contract and the declara-
tion : Id.
Where an assignee before maturity receives a promissory note which
discloses upon its face the fact that usurious interest is reserved, he is
bound to take notice thereof, and will hold the note subject to that
defence: 1d.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See Homestead; Partition.
Reservation by the Vendor- What constitutes.-A party sold his in-
terest in a tract of land, the legal title of which was in another, and an
agreement in writing was entered into between the vendor and pur-
chaser, by the terms of which the former was to have a certain time in
which to remove some wine plants growing upon the premises. The
person holding the legal title was authorized verbally by the vendor to
convey to the purchaser on the payment of a certain sum of money to
which the land was subject. The payment being made, the holder
of the legal title, at the request of the purchaser, conveyed the land
to the wife of the latter, the deed containing no clause of reservation
of the wine plants. Held, that the written reservation was operative
according to its terms, and secured to the vendor the right to remove
the plants within the time agreed upon. The fact that the deed con-
tained no reservation was immaterial, as it was not made by the vendor,
nor did he authorize it to be made without the reservation: Ring v.
Billings et al., 51 Ills.
Quwre, whether the tendor, in such case, could set up his written
reservation against a subsequent deed made by himself not containing
a reservation : Id.
The wife of the purchaser, to whom the conveyance was made, occu-
pied no better position in respect to the reservation, than he would have
held as grantee, since she was a volunteer, and had, moreover, full notice
of the fact that the reservation was made : Id.
The written reservation made the plants, as between the vendor ana
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purchaser, and the wife of the latter, personal property; as much so as
if they had been taken from the ground: Id.
Statute of Frauds.-Where a purchaser of land, after paying a por-
tion of the consideration and promising to pay the rest, fails to do so,
he cannot, on being sued for the balance of the consideration, set up his
own breach of promise as a defence to the action, in this, that because
he did not perform, the statute of frauds applies; where he, by reason
of the vendor's performance, is in possession and is enjoying the benefit
of the estate purchased: Cagger Administratrix v. Lenning, 57 Barb.
Trover- Conversion -The vendor, within the time limited for the
purpose, sought to remove the plants according to the reservation, but
the grantee, the wife of the purchaser, the latter being absent, forbade
him to take them. Held, in an action of trover by the vendor'against
the husband and wifd, in answer to the objection that no conversion by
the former was shown, that inasmuch as the purchaser insisted the deed
should be made to his wife, and from her refusal of the plants, the jury
might infer he had the deed thus made to escape the obligation of his
agreement, and that in regard to the plants she acted under his au-
thority: Id.
It might, moreover, well be held, that the mere fact of procuring
the deed to be made to his wife, followed as this was by her claiming
the plants, was, in itself, a technical conversion on his part, and as he
thereby placed in his wife the title of the land where the plants were
growing, she was the proper person on whom to make the demand : Id.
VOTER.
Desertion from .Military Service.-No citizen of this state can be
deprived of the right of suffrage under the Act of Congress of March
2d 1865, c. 79, § 21, until after conviction and sentence by a court-
martial of the United States: State v. Slmonds, 57 Me.
An indictment for illegal voting at an election of state officers based
upon a disqualification by reason of desertion from the army of the
United States, must specifically set forth the crime of desertion : Id.
Evidence of the defendant's admission of the crime of desertion is
not admissible in support of an indictment for illegal voting, not con-
taining any allegation of desertion : 1d.
Nor is the unauthenticated roll of the company to which he be-
longed: Id.
WILL.
Promise to make-S pecific Performatce.-An agreement to dispose
of property by will in a particular way, if made upon a sufficient con-
sideration, is valid and binding; and where the contract has been par-
tially performed, equity will enforce a specific performance of the contract.
although not made in writing, if the failure works a fraud upon the
other party: Gulpton and Wife v. aupton, 46 or 47 Mo
Parties seeking to establish- Wihat must be proved.-A party seeking
to establish a will, must prove the testator was of disposing mind and
memory at the time he n:ade it, and this cannot be shown merely by
proof that lie was so at some anterior period: Holloway v. Galloway,
51 Ills.
